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What a pass-the-hash attack is, how attackers reuse NTLM hashes, how to detect it, and nine defenses, from Windows LAPS to Credential Guard.


Content writer, trio.so
A pass-the-hash attack is when an attacker steals the NTLM password hash of a Windows account, usually from a computer's memory, and uses that hash to sign in to other machines as that user, without ever knowing the password. It is one of the most common ways attackers move from one compromised PC to the rest of a Windows network. To prevent it, stop the same local administrator password from working on every machine (Windows LAPS), keep privileged accounts off ordinary workstations, protect the credentials in memory (Credential Guard, LSA protection and the Protected Users group), restrict NTLM, and remove local admin rights from everyday users. To catch it, watch for unusual NTLM network logons and for tools reading the memory of the Windows credential process.
If a penetration test or an audit flagged pass-the-hash in your domain, the nine defenses below are in the order most teams can put them in place; the detection section covers what to watch while you do.
Windows does not need your password to prove who you are over NTLM, the older Windows authentication protocol. It needs a value derived from the password: the NTLM hash. Whoever holds that hash can answer the server's challenge exactly as the real user would. MITRE ATT&CK lists this as technique T1550.002, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash.
Two habits make this easy: the same local administrator password on every PC, and administrators signing in to ordinary workstations, where their credentials are left in memory.
Defenders should know the names, because they show up in alerts and incident reports. Mimikatz is the best-known tool for extracting hashes from memory and using them. Impacket, NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) and Metasploit include modules that authenticate with a hash to run commands remotely. Most endpoint protection and EDR products detect these tools, but attackers modify them, so do not rely on tool detection alone.
Overpass-the-hash turns a stolen NTLM hash into Kerberos access. Kerberos can use the NTLM hash as the key for the older RC4 encryption type, so an attacker with the hash can request a Kerberos ticket-granting ticket from a domain controller and then use normal Kerberos tickets. This helps the attacker where NTLM is blocked or watched closely. The defenses are to remove RC4 from Kerberos where your systems allow it, so domain controllers require AES, to put privileged accounts in the Protected Users group, and to watch for ticket requests that use RC4 (event 4768 with encryption type 0x17) from accounts that normally use AES.
Collect these events centrally, and check Microsoft's current event documentation on Microsoft Learn, because field names and audit settings differ between Windows versions.
Nine defenses, in roughly the order a small team can put them in place. Each one blocks a different step of the attack.
Windows LAPS sets a random, rotating password for the built-in local administrator account on each computer and stores it in Active Directory or Microsoft Entra ID. A hash stolen from one PC then opens only that PC, not the whole fleet.
Use the Group Policy settings "Deny access to this computer from the network" and "Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services" with the built-in group "Local account and member of Administrators group". Keep the registry value LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy at its default of 0, so User Account Control strips admin rights from local accounts used remotely.
Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate the secrets that LSASS would otherwise keep in normal memory, so tools cannot read NTLM hashes or Kerberos keys from it. Microsoft turns it on by default on eligible Windows 11 Enterprise and Education devices from version 22H2; check that it is actually running on yours.
LSA protection (RunAsPPL) runs LSASS as a protected process, which blocks most tools from reading its memory. Test it with your security and smart card software first, because some older add-ins do not load once it is on.
Members of Protected Users cannot authenticate with NTLM, do not have their credentials cached, cannot use RC4 or DES in Kerberos, and get short-lived Kerberos tickets. Add domain administrators and other high-value accounts, after testing that nothing they use depends on NTLM.
Turn on NTLM auditing first, with the "Network security: Restrict NTLM" policies, to see what still uses it. Then block NTLM where nothing needs it, starting with privileged accounts and servers. Microsoft has deprecated NTLM and is moving Windows toward Kerberos, so this work also prepares you for that change.
Keep accounts that administer domain controllers and servers off ordinary workstations entirely. Admins use separate accounts for each tier and do their admin work from dedicated, hardened privileged access workstations. If a domain admin never signs in to a user's PC, there is no domain admin hash on it to steal. See privileged access management best practices.
Stealing hashes from memory needs administrator rights on the machine. Users who work as standard users make that first step much harder, and deploying apps centrally removes the usual reason they ask for admin rights. See least privilege access model and excessive permissions.
Attackers usually need a first foothold before they can steal hashes. Keep Windows and third-party apps patched, run endpoint protection or an EDR tool that flags credential theft, and act on its alerts. See EDR vs MDM.
A note on multi-factor authentication: MFA on cloud sign-ins and VPNs is essential, but it does not stop pass-the-hash inside a Windows network, because NTLM authentication with a stolen hash never asks for a second factor. The defenses above are what close that gap.
Most of the defenses above are set in Active Directory: Group Policy for local account restrictions, NTLM auditing and blocking, and Credential Guard; the Protected Users group; LAPS password storage; and the separation of admin accounts into tiers. Reviewing who is in Domain Admins and other privileged groups, removing stale accounts, and alerting on changes to those groups all reduce what an attacker can reach with a stolen hash. For the rest of the directory side, see Active Directory security.
trio.so is not an EDR. It shows Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts next to each device, and patches Windows and third-party apps with the CVE severity of each finding, so the footholds attackers use to steal hashes get fixed.

Pass-the-hash works because Windows accepts a hash in place of a password, and because the same credentials are reused across machines. Make local admin passwords unique, keep privileged accounts off workstations, protect credentials in memory, reduce NTLM, and remove local admin rights, then watch for the signs in your logs. For the wider picture of how attackers get in, see unauthorized access to computer systems and defense in depth.
trio.so shows Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts next to each device and patches Windows and third-party apps with the CVE severity of each finding.
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